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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,

Case No.

vs.
JOHN WENKEL and ROBERT
GRAHAM,

Court of Appeals No. 910418CA

Defendants/Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court err in ruling as a matter of law that
the Utah Dram Shop Act (Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated
(1953

as

amended))

applies

only

to

commercial

hosts

in

a

commercial setting and does not apply to a social host supplying
alcoholic beverages in a social setting?
Did the trial court err in denying the plaintiff's Motion
to Amend Complaint by ruling there is no common law action in
favor of an injured person against an individual supplier of
alcohol?
OPINION BELOW
The decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed
is Sneddon v. Wenkel, 175 Utah Adv. Reports 13(CA, 11-25-91).
JURISDICTION
On November

25, 1991, the Court of Appeals

issued

its

decision affirming the trial court's summary judgment against
her.

Petitioner

Sneddon

timely

filed

and

was

granted

an

extension of time in which to file this petition by the Utah
Supreme Court on December 26, 1991.

This Court has jurisdiction

to consider the petition pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §21-22(3)(a) (Supp. 1991) and §78-2a-4 (1986).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Rules 15 and 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated
reproduction

of

the

entire

statute

contained in the addendum hereto.

(1953 as amended).

and

applicable

rules

A
is

To the extent petitioner

relies on any other statutes or rules, the same are included in
the body of this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order of the District Court
of Weber County, wherein the court granted defendant Graham's
Motion for Summary Judgment ruling that the Utah Dram Shop Act
as contained in Section 32A-14-1 does not apply in a social
setting, and was intended to apply only to the commercial sale
of alcoholic beverages.
entered

on

September

(R. 175).

28, 1989.

The summary judgment was

On November

21, 1989, the

plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint seeking to add
a common law negligence action against defendant Graham.

The

case against co-defendant Wenkel was still pending at the time
plaintiff moved to amend her complaint.

(R. 181).

The summary judgment in favor of the defendant Graham did
2

not become a final order of the court until the court entered its
order denying plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint on April 16,
1990.

In fact, an appeal of the court's summary judgment was

initially filed on October 25, 1989.

(R. 177). On December 20,

1989, defendant moved the Supreme Court for an order dismissing
the appeal for the reason that the action against co-defendant,
Wenkel, was still pending at the time of the initial appeal.
211-213, 218-219).

(R.

Subsequent to the October 25, 1989, Notice

of Appeal, the Supreme Court, on stipulation of counsel, remanded
the appeal to the trial court for the purpose of deciding the
Plaintiff's pending Motion to Amend Complaint in order to obtain
a final order from the trial court.

(R. 218). During the above-

described sequence of procedural events, the case against codefendant, Wenkel, had been settled, but was not dismissed by the
trial court until February 14„ 1990, pursuant to stipulation of
counsel.

(R. 237-239).

The matter was orally argued to the Court of Appeals on
October 25, 1991.

On November 25, 1991, the Court of Appeals

affirmed the trial court's grant of Graham's Motion for Summary
Judgment

and

complaint.

the

denial

of

Sneddon's

motion

to

amend

her

Graham, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. at p.16.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

This case arose out of an automobile accident occurring on
April 26, 1986, wherein the plaintiff was injured as a result of
defendant Graham's vehicle colliding with her vehicle while the
plaintiff was parked in her own driveway.
3

Defendants Graham and Wenkel, worked together at Hill Air
Force Base and on the night in question stopped at a local
convenience

store on their way to Graham's home where

purchased his favorite brand of beer.

each

At Graham's home, Wenkel

consumed the twelve (12) beers he had purchased, as they drank
through the night.

(Graham depo. 3-1-89, p.21, 11. 8-9). Graham

also supplied Wenkel more beer which Wenkel proceeded to consume
while at Graham's home.

(Wenkel depo. 8-3-88, p.4, 11. 5-7).

Graham understood Wenkel had previously been picked up for DUI
(Graham depo. 3-1-89, p. 10, 11. 19). Further, Graham had seen
Wenkel intoxicated a number of times before the accident at
issue.

(IcL, p. 34, 11. 19-23).

When Wenkel decided to leave

Graham's home and drive to his own residence, Graham expressed
concern because Wenkel had been drinking all night, (_Id., p.26,
11. 20-22) but did nothing to effectively stop him from driving
his car.
At approximately 8:00 a.m. the following morning, after
having drank throughout the night and early morning, Wenkel left
the Graham home to drive to his own residence.
1-89, p.29, 11. 4-6).

(Graham depo. 3-

In route, Wenkel lost control of his

vehicle and jumped the curb near the plaintiff's home, crashing
into the plaintiff while the plaintiff was seated in a vehicle
in her own driveway.

Wenkel's blood alcohol content at the time

of the accident was .19% by weight.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE BROAD LANGUAGE AND HISTORY OF UTAH'S DRAM SHOP ACT
CLEARLY INDICATES THAT THE ACT IS INTENDED TO APPLY
TO SOCIAL HOSTS
Utah's original Dram Shop Act, formerly 32-11-1, Utah Code
Annotated (1981), provided:
[A]ny person who gives, sells, or otherwise
provides intoxicating liquor to another contrary
to . . . Section 32-7-14 or Section 32-7-24(b)
or (c), and thereby causes the intoxication of
another person, is liable for injuries in
person, property, or means of support to any
third person, or the spouse, child, or parent of
that
third
person,
resulting
from
the
intoxication.
(2) A person who suffers an injury referred to
in subsection (1) of this section shall have a
cause of action against the intoxicated person
and the person who provided the intoxicating
liquor in violation of subsection (1) above or
either of them.
At the time the original dram shop statute was enacted,
Section 32-7-14 provided that:
no person shall sell or supply any alcoholic
beverage or permit alcoholic beverages to be
sold or supplied to any person under or
apparently under the influence of alcohol,
Utah Code Annotated (1943) (repealed 1985) (Emphasis added).
Section 32-7-24 provided that:
no person shall: (a) permit drunkenness to take
place in any house or on any premises of which
he is the owner, tenant, or occupant; or (b)
permit or suffer any person apparently under the
influence of liquor to consume any liquor in any
house or on any premises of which the first
named person is the owner, tenant, or occupant;
or (c) give any liquor to any person apparently
under the influence of liquor.
5

Utah Code Annotated §32-7-24 (1943) (repealed 1985) (Emphasis
added).
The obvious intent of the original Dram Shop Act (Section
32-11-1, Utah Code Annotated) was to regulate not only the sale
and distribution, but the possession and use of alcohol in a
social setting, including within private residences.
The Dram Shop Act, relevant in this case, uses essentially
the

same

language

as

the

original

1981

Act

when

imposing

liability upon individuals who violate the provisions of the act.
Rather than refer specifically to other statutory references,
such as the former Sections 32-7-14 and 32-7-24, the statute in
effect at the time of the court's summary judgment provided:
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or
otherwise provides liquor, or at a location
allowing consumption on the premises, any
alcoholic beverage, to a person:
(a) who is under the age of twentyone (21) years, or
(b) who is apparently under the
influence of intoxicating alcoholic
beverages or products or drugs, or
(c) whom the person furnishing the
alcoholic beverage knew or should have
known from the circumstances was under
the
influence
of
intoxicating
alcoholic beverages or products or
drugs, or
(d) who is a known interdicted person,
and by those actions causes the
intoxication of that person, is liable
for injuries in person, property, or
means of support to any third person,
or
to the spouse, child, or parent
of that third person resulting from
the intoxication.
An employer is
6

liable for the
employees
in
chapter.

actions
violation

of
of

its
this

(2)
A person who suffers an injury under
subsection (1) has a cause of action against the
person who provided the liquor or alcoholic
beverage in violation of subsection (1).
(Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated 1986) (Emphasis added).
The 1990 statute is virtually the same as the 1986 act, and
continues to provide liability to any person providing liquor or
alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons. (Compare Section 3211-1;

Section

amendment).
intoxicating

32A-14-1,
The

1986

amendment

amendment;
broadening

liquor to include

32A-14-101,
the

definition

1990
of

"any alcoholic beverage" was

effective on March 17, 1986, more than thirty (30) days before
the April 26, 1986, accident giving rise to this law suit.

The

general intent of the Dram Shop Act is further supported by
Section 32A-12-205, Utah Code Annotated (1990) which prohibits
the

furnishing

or

interdicted person.

supplying

of

alcoholic

beverages

to

any

Former Section 32A-12-10 stated:

(1) No person shall sell, offer to sell, or
otherwise furnish or supply, any alcoholic
.beverage or product to any known interdicted
person. . .
Section 32A-12-10, Utah Code Annotated 1985).

See Also: Coffman

v. Kennedy, (1977, 1st Dist. ) 74 Col. App. 3d 28, 141 Cal. Rptr.
267, citing with approval Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha
Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18 (Or. 1971).
In Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 34, 763 P.2d 806
(Utah 1988), this court held that "where statutory language is
7

plain and unambiguous, this court will not look beyond to define
legislative intent."

The Allisen court cited Johnson v. Utah

State Retirement Board, 770 P.2d 93 (Utah 1988), in ruling that
the Supreme Court is guided by the rule that a statute should be
construed according to its. plain language,

Allisen at 809.

In construing the plain language of the 1986 Dram Shop Act
in effect at the time of the accident giving rise to the present
case, it is clear that the Act did not limit its application to
the commercial

setting.

The plain

language of the

statute

provided:
Any person who directly gives, sells, or
otherwise provides liquor, or at a location
allowing consumption on the premises, any
alcoholic beverage, to a person [in violation of
the statute] and by those actions causes the
intoxication of that person, is liable for
injuries . . .
to any third person
resulting from the intoxication.
Section 32-14-1 Utah Code Ann. 1986 amend. (Emphasis added).
Clearly, the "any person" language of the statute is plain
and unambiguous and must be construed to apply to the social, as
well as, the commercial setting.
apparently agrees.

With this, the Court of Appeals

Sneddon v. Graham, 175 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 13, 15.

Had the legislature intended that the statute only apply to the
commercial setting, the plain language of the statute should have
excluded the term "any person" and included terms such as "seller",
"commercial distributor or provider", "tavern", or such other terms
strictly designed to limit the application of the act to the
commercial setting.
It is also clear that a "person" may be held liable under
8

the Act for providing either "liquor" or "alcoholic beverages", the
latter including beer which was the drink served by Graham to
Wenkel under the facts of this case.
This court has previously held that the best indicator of
legislative intent is the statute's plain language, and that in the
absence of ambiguity there is nothing to construe.

See Jensen v.

Intermountain Health Care, 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984); State v.
Archiletta, 526 P.2d 911, 912 (Utah 1974).

Clearly, there is

nothing ambiguous in the language of the 1986 Dram Shop Act.

The

Act must, therefore, be broadly construed to include social hosts
as well as commercial providers of alcohol.
POINT II
OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE FOUND LIABILITY FOR SOCIAL
HOSTS UNDER SIMILAR DRAM SHOP ACTS
In Williams v.

Klemesrud,

197 N.W.2d

614

(1972

Iowa),

overruled on other grounds; Lewis v. State of Iowa, 256 N.W. 181,
(1977 Iowa), the Iowa Supreme Court refused to hold that the Iowa
Dram Shop Act applied only to those engaged in liquor traffic or
sales.

The court ruled that such statutes were remedial or

compensatory in nature and, therefore, refused to adopt rules of
strict construction which would limit the statute's scope and
thus impair the remedy and advance the mischief sought to be
corrected.
Other jurisdictions whose Dram Shop Acts contain similar
language to that contained in the Utah statute have ruled that
dram shop liability extends to the social host.
9

In Martin v.

Watts, 508 S.2d 1136 (1987 Alabama), the Alabama Supreme Court
held

that

a

statute

which

granted

a person

injured

by

an

intoxicated person a right of action against the person who
provided the intoxicant in violation of state law provided a
cause of action against the social host for injuries received as
a result of an automobile accident.
social

host's

contentions

that

the

The court rejected the
statute

applied

only

to

commercial dispensers of alcohol since the statute included the
terms "giving" and "otherwise disposing of."

The court further

held that it was hard to imagine a phrase more expansive than
"otherwise disposing of".

Neither was the court persuaded that

the title of the act ("Illegal Liquor Sales") discounted its
application to social hosts.
The Martin

court

Id. at p. 1141.

also noted

that

the

trend

in

recent

decisions of other jurisdictions was to allow causes of action
where adults had assisted in furnishing alcoholic beverages to
minors.

Id. at 1141. In Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P. 2d 133

(Utah 1978), this court recognized the possibility of a common
law negligence action in the form of contribution between a beer
retailer and minor motorist for claims arising from an automobile
accident and resulting injury to third parties.
Re

Chiverton,

469

N.W.2d

312

(Mich. App.

Hutchings, 327 S.E.2d 716 (Ga 1985);

See also:

1991);

Sutter

In
v.

Fassett v. Betta Kappa

Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 1986, Penn); Koback v. Crook, 366
N.W.2d 857 (1985).

This same rationale justifies application of

the Utah Dram Shop Act to social hosts, given the similarity of
10

the terminology since the Utah Act imposes liability on any
person who "gives" or "otherwise provides" alcohol in violation
of the statute.
POINT III
PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS APPLICATION OF UTAH'S
DRAM SHOP ACT TO SOCIAL HOSTS
The clear intent of Dram Shop liability is twofold:

(1)

provide a remedy to innocent third persons who suffer injury as
a result of the misuse and abuse of alcohol, and (2) impose some
responsibility

on

those

persons

who

individuals in violation of the statute.

provide

alcohol

to

To say that social

hosts should not be held liable for irresponsibly

providing

alcohol to guests whom they know, or should know, are under the
influence of alcohol is to completely disregard the remedial
nature of the statute.
A number of courts have held that social hosts who serve
liquor to social guests are liable for resulting injuries to
third parties because of the guests' intoxication.

In Kelly v.

Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (NJ 1984), the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated:
It is society where thousands of deaths are
caused each year by drunken drivers, where the
damage caused by such deaths is regarded
increasingly
as intolerable, where
liquor
licensees
are
prohibited
from
serving
intoxicated adults, and where long-standing
criminal sanctions against drunken driving have
recently been significantly strengthened to the
point where the Governor notes that they are
regarded as the toughest in the nation, See
Governor's Annual Message to the N.J. State
Legislature, Jan. 10, 1984. The imposition of
such a duty by the judiciary seems both fair and
11

fully in accord with the State's policy. Unlike
those cases in which the definition of desirable
policy is the subject of intense controversy,
here the imposition of a duty is both consistent
with and supportive of social goal - the
reduction
of
drunken
driving
- that
is
practically unanimously accepted by society.
Id. at p.1222.
In Gwinnell, the New Jersey court found that a host who
serves liquor to an adult social guest, knowing both that the
guest

is

intoxicated

and

will

thereafter

be

operating

an

automobile, is liable for the subsequent injuries of a third
party as a result of the negligent operation of the car by the
adult guest when such negligence is caused by the intoxication.
The

profound

truth

disregarded by this Court.

enunciated

in

Gwinnell

cannot

be

No justifiable reason for limiting

Utah's Dram Shop Act to not include the homeowner or social guest
can be made.

To argue that the act should impose liability only

on licensees who derive a profit from serving liquor is to ignore
the entire purpose behind the act.

Simply stated, liability

proceeds from the duty of care that relates to control of the
liquor supply.

Arguments concerning "profits" to tavern or bar

owners simply jump this analysis.
It is much easier to correctly read Utah's Dram Shop Act as
requiring a social host to take the relatively small task upon
him of supervising his intoxicated guests than for the public to
deal with the serious injury or death which results when the
actions of the social host are not liable under the statute.
And, what difference is there between a person's liability under
12

auto insurance for lending his car to an intoxicated person?

The

theory behind both the car owner and the social host is the same,
and the public will benefit greatly by this application.

Surely

the financial impact of a homeowner's increased insurance is far
less valuable than the incredible loss suffered by Utah residents
as a result of drunk driving.

As concluded by the Gwinnell

court:
. the adjustments in social behavior at
parties, the burden put on the host to
reasonably oversee the serving of liquor, the
burden on the guest to make sure if one is
drinking that another is driving, and the burden
on all to take those reasonable steps even if,
on* some occasion, some guests may become
belligerent: those social dislocations, their
importance, must be measured against the misery,
death, and destruction caused by the drunken
driver. Does our society morally approve of the
decision to continue to allow the charm of
unrestrained social drinking when the cost is
the lives of others, sometimes of the guests
themselves?
Id. at p. 1229.

Utah's Dram Shop Act must be correctly read to

adequately protect the citizens of this state from drunk drivers,
no matter who provided them with their alcoholic beverages.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
AMEND ITS COMPLAINT TO ADD A COMMON LAW CAUSE OF ACTION.
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
a party may amend his pleading only upon obtaining leave of the
court or by written consent of the adverse party.

Rule 15

further provides that "leave shall be freely given when justice
so requires."
had

The Court of Appeals found that the trial court

jurisdiction

to

rule

on

Sneddon's
13

motion

to

amend

her

complaint.

Sneddon v. Graham, supra, at p.16.

Plaintiff's

initial appeal was remanded to the district court for purposes
of deciding plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint.

The court

issued its order denying plaintiff's motion ruling that "if it
is deemed appropriate at the procedural juncture of this case to
move to amend the complaint, the court is of the opinion that
there is not a common law cause of action running in favor of a
person injured against a person who supplied alcohol . . .".
(R. 249).

While the trial court's order denying plaintiff's

Motion to Amend Complaint is less than clear, it appears on its
face that the trial court denied plaintiff's motion because the
court was of the opinion there is no common law action in favor
of a injured person against a third party supplier of alcohol.
In considering motions to amend pleadings, this court has
ruled that determining factors include:

(1) lack of prejudice

to either party; and (2) whether the amendments were attempted
prior to trial.

Lewis v. Maul tree, 627 P. 2d 94 (Utah 1981).

Given the procedural posture of the case at the time plaintiff
moved

to amend, there would

have been no prejudice

to the

defendants in allowing the amendment since the case had not yet
gone to trial.

In addition, Graham cannot claim prejudice or

surprise in Sneddon's seeking to hold him liable under a common
law negligence theory since Graham's actions allowing Wenkel to
become intoxicated at his home and further allowing him to drive
his automobile when he left Graham's residence has been the crux
of Sneddon's complaint since the beginning of this lawsuit. This
14

being the case, there is no procedural reason upon which the
court's denial of plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint may be
based.
Since

there

is no procedural

basis

for

the

denial

of

plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, it« must be assumed that
the court has denied the plaintiff's Motion to Amend by ruling
as a matter of law that there is no common law cause of action
in favor of an injured person against a third party supplier of
alcohol.

Contrary to the trial court's finding, a common law

action for negligent serving of alcohol is recognized in many
states, arguably including Utah.
In Albertson's, supra, this court found that a grocery
outlet which sold beer to a certain minor may be liable for
subsequent injuries to third parties involved in an automobile
accident with the minor when the retailer reasonably should have
foreseen the likelihood of the beer sale being combined with an
accident and resulting injuries.

Although not recognized by the

court of appeals in its review of this case, Rees v. Albertson's
arguably creates a special relationship between retailers and
third parties injured by drunken drivers, thus creating the
necessary "duty" for liability to be found under Utah's adoption
of §315 of the Restatement of Torts (Second).

The analogy in

Rees would arguably also apply to the social host who serves
alcohol to an intoxicated guest resulting in injuries to a third
party.
In McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141
15

(Mass. 1986), the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a social
host could be held liable on common-law grounds to a person
injured by an intoxicated guest's negligent operation of a motor
vehicle where a host knew or should have known that his guest was
drunk.

Likewise, in Kelly v. Gwinnell, supra, the New Jersey

Supreme Court ruled that a social host has a duty to the public
not to create a foreseeable and unreasonable risk by providing
alcohol to intoxicated guests, and that if he choses to do so,
he will be held liable in a negligence

action for injuries

suffered by a third party as a result of the intoxicated guestrs
negligent driving.

In Solberg v. Johnson, 760 P. 2d 867 (Or.

1988), a tavern owner who had settled claims brought against him
by

a person

brought

a

injured

in an

third-party

automobile

action

motorist's "social hosts".

for

accident

contribution

successfully
against

the

The Oregon Supreme Court based its

reasoning, in part, on the knowledge of the hosts as to the
motorist's drinking problem and their continuance in serving
alcoholic beverages to him once he was visibly intoxicated.
See also: Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (NJ 1984);

Pike

v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. App. 1968); Rappaport v. Nichols,
156 A.2d 1 (NJ 1959); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 18,
(Mass. 1967);

Calligan v. Cousar, 187 N.E.2d 292 (111. 1963).

While the Utah Supreme Court has expressly refused to rule
whether there is a common law action for the negligent supply of
liquor, the modern trend and public policy suggests that an
action ought to be recognized.

Allisen v. American Legion Post
16

No. 134, supra; Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., supra.
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
ruling of the Court of Appeals on the issue of the Dram Shop
Act f s application to social hosts.

Plaintiff further requests

that this Court reverse the Court of Appealf s ruling denying
plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint to allow plaintiff to add
a common law negligence cause of action against defendant Graham.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^X ^L^ day of January, 1992.

WARD

CHRISTOPHER L. SHAW
Attorneys for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify four (4) true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, this
ffi

day of January, 1992, to Paul N. Belnap and Brett G.

Pearce, attorneys for defendant Graham, at Strong & Hanni, Sixth
Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.

£JZ niuj^Q
CHRISTOPHER L. SHAW
:torneys for Petitioner
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ADDENDUM
Section 32A-14-101, Utah Code Annotated
Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment
Court of Appeals Decision
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32A-14-101. Liability for injuries resulting from distribution of alcoholic beverages — Causes of action —
Statute of limitations — Employee protections.
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or at a
location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to the
following persons, and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person,
is liable for iryuries in person, property, or means of support to any third
person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from
the intoxication:
(a) any person under the age of 21 years;
(b) any person who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating
alcoholic beverages or products or drugs;
(c) any .person whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage
knew or should have known from the circumstances was under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; or
(d) any person who is a known interdicted person.
(2) An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of this
chapter.
(3) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of
action against the person who provided the alcoholic beverage in violation of
Subsection (1).
(4) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the rights
or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that person's estate.
(5) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter that arises after July 1, 1985 is
limited to $100,000 and the aggregate amount which may be awarded to all
persons injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to $300,000.
(6) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter shall be
commenced within two years after the date of the injury.
(7) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional
recovery against the person causing the injury.
(8) (a) A sanction or termination of employment may not be imposed upon
any employee of any restaurant, airport lounge, private club, on-premise
beer retailer, or any other establishment serving alcoholic beverages as a
result of the employee having exercised the employee's independent judgment to refuse to sell alcoholic beverages to any person the employee
considers to meet one or more of the conditions described in Subsection
(1).
:•
(b) Any employer who terminates an employee or imposes sanctions on
the employee contrary to this section is considered to have discriminated
against that employee and is subject to the conditions and penalties set
forth in Chapter 35, Title 34, the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act.
History: C. 1953, 32A-14-1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 3; 1989,
ch. 240, $ 1; renumbered by L. 1990, ch- 23,
* 178.
Amendment Notes, — The 1989 amend*
ment, effective April 24, 1989, added Subsection (7) and made minor stylistic changes.
The 1990 amendment, effective February 21,
1990, renumbered this section, which formerly
appeared as $ 32A-14-1; transferred the Ian*
guage after Nto the following persons" at the
end of the introductory paragraph in Subsection (1) from Subsection (l)(d); designated the
former final sentence in Subsection (lXd) as

present Subsection (2); designated former Subsections (2) to (7) as present Subsections (3) to
(8); deleted "liquor or other" before "alcoholic
beverage" in present Subsection (3); substituted "July I, 1985" for "the effective date of
this subsection" in present Subsection (5); deleted "which arises after the effective date of
this subsection" after "chapter" in present Subsection (6); substituted "airport lounge, private
club, on-premise beer retailer, or any other establishment" for "club, or any other facility" in
present Subsection (8)(a); and made changes in
phraseology and punctuation.

32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale
or other distribution of alcoholic beverages —
Injured person's cause of action against intoxicated person or persons who provided alcoholic beverage — Survival of action.
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or
at a location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage,
to a person:
(a) who is under the age of 21 years or
(b) who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic
beverages or products or drugs or
(c) whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or
should have known from the circumstances was under the influence of
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or
(d) who is a known interdicted person,
and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, is liable for
injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third person, or to
the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the intoxication. An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of
this chapter.
(2) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of
action against the person who provided the liquor or other alcoholic beverage m violation of Subsection (U.
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the
rights or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that
person's estate.
(4) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person
pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter which arises after the
effective date of this subsection is limited to $100,000 and the aggregate
amount which may be awarded to all persons injured as a result of one
occurrence is limited to $300,000.
(5) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter which
arises after the effective date of this subsection shall be commenced within
two years after the date of the injury.
(6) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional
recovery against the person causing the iiyury.
History: C. 1953,32A-14-1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, effective March 17, 1986, added the
language in Subsection (1) following "or otherwise provides liquor," Subsections (l)(a)
through (l)(d), the last sentence in Subsection (1), and Subsections (4) through (6); inserted "directly" in Subsection (1) near the

beginning; in Subsection (2), inserted "or
other alcoholic beverage"; and made minor
stylistic changes.
Compder's Notes. — The phrase "effective date of this subsection," referred to in
Subsections (4) and (5), appears in Laws
1986, ch. 177, § 3, which became effective
March 17,1986.

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.

Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the x:ourt may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the tfourt that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of ail the parties.

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON,
\

RULING ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
\

JOHN WENKEL and
ROBERT GRAHAM,

Case No.

870999559

Defendant.
The parties agree that for purposes of this motion, the
conduct

complained

of

arose

in

a

social

as

opposed

to a

commercial setting.
The Court is persuaded that the statute in question is
not intended to apply in a social, setting and accordingly grants
defendant Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this

J()

day of September, 1989,

RULING
Sneddon v. Wenkel et al
Case No. 870999559
Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the sdstt- day of September,
1989 I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling
counsel as follows:
Erik M. Ward
Attorney for Plaintiff
635 Twenty Fifth ^Street
Ogden# Utah 84401
Lynn S. Davies
Attorney for Defendant Wenkel
Key Bank Tower Suite 700
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Paul M. Belnap
Attorney for Defendant Graham
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

to

Paul M. Belnap, #0279
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—

ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON,
Plaintiff,

—

—

—

—

—

—

in —

—

—

i

' •

]
i

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
Civil No. 99559
JOHN WENKEL and ROBERT
GRAHAM,

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came before the court on the
defendant Robert Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The court

having reviewed the memoranda submitted in support of the motion
and in opposition to the motion, and having issued its Memorandum
Decision determining that the statutes in question were not
intended to apply in a social setting as found in this case, it
is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant

Robert Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and that
the plaintiff's complaint against Robert Graham is hereby

dismissed with prejudice, costs to defendant Graham.
DATED t h i s

j5

day of Afp^kD-a

flfJLA^

, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

ME
Stanton

M. Taylor
District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this^JT^T

day of /y-/^Hf^/_

/

1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing summary Judgment
was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Erik M. Ward
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
P. 0. BOX 1850
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84402
Lynn s. Davies
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, seventh Floor
50 South Main street
P-. o. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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v

Paul M. Belnap, #0279
Brett G. Pearce, #5220
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant,
Robert Graham
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON,
Plaintiff,
i

ORDER

v.
JOHN WENKEL and ROBERT
GRAHAM,
Defendants.

i

Civil No. 870999559

]

Judge Stanton Taylor

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 12th
day of March, 1990, at the hour of 10:45 A.M. before the
Honorable Stanton Taylor, District Court Judge, on Plaintiff's
Motion to Amend Complaint.
The plaintiff was represented by her counsel of record
and defendant Robert Graham was represented by his counsel of
record.
The court having previously granted Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment and having entered its Summary Judgment
dated November 3, 1989, dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff

with prejudice, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Complaint
to "add a cause of action against the defendant, Robert Graham,
based upon a theory of common law negligence in supplying
intoxicating liquor to the co-defendant, John Wenkel."
A proposed amended complaint was not presented with the
motion, but counsel for plaintiff presented argument as to the
basis for the amended complaint.
Having reviewed the motion, and the memorandum in
opposition to the same, and having heard the argument of counsel
together with the procedural posture of the case, with the court
having previously dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, and the
court having indicated at the time of the hearing that if it is
deemed appropriate at the procedural juncture of this case to
move to amend the complaint, the court is of the opinion that
there is not a common law cause of action tunning in favor of a
person injured against a person who supplied alcohol, nor does
the court believe that the provisions of Utahfs Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act afford to the plaintiff a cause of action
under the facts and circumstances of this case and, therefore, it
is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the

-2-

plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is denied/.
DATED this

LI

, 1990.

day of

District /Sour"
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this 3c^

day of /?lJ./,sJi^

1990, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed,
postage prepaid, to:
Erik M. Ward
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Lynn S. Davies
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P. O. Box 2465
Salt Lake city, Utah 84110

<*.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BENCHMARK, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v,
SALT LAKE VALLEY MENTAL HEALTH
BOARD, INC., a Utah corporation, and Sail
Lake County, a political entity,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 910393
FILED: December 13, 1991
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Richard H. Moffat
ATTORNEYS:
Thomas T. Billings, David L. Arrington,
Bryon J. Benevento, Kathryn D. Kendell,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
Joseph C. Rust, John M. Wunderli, Salt Lake
City, for defendants
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Tenant breached the lease by failing to give
notice of termination of the lease six months
before moving out.
On its motion for summary disposition,
Tenant first argues that the trial court manifestly erred in granting summary judgment, as
genuine disputes of material fact are still at
issue. Factual issues exist with respect to
whether Landlord or Tenant breached the
lease and whether Landlord constructively
evicted Tenant by failing to make the building
habitable for Tenant's employees and clients.
Tenant also argues that the award of damages
is manifestly erroneous since Tenant gave
notice of termination of the lease and should
pay only the six monthly rentals for the notice
term plus the $40,000 limit for remodeling.
We agree that there are issues of fact to be
adjudicated on the first of these points. As for
the second, the measure of damages, we agree
with Tenant that the rents due could not
exceed six months' rent, plus remodeling
expenses in an amount not to exceed $40,000.
We remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

Cite as

175 Utah Adv. Rep. 13

PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on appellants' motion for summary disposition pursuant to rule 10, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. The motion to reverse is granted,
and the case is remanded for trial on the
merits.
Plaintiff was the landlord ("Landlord"), and
defendant Salt Lake Valley Mental Health
Board, assignee of Salt Lake County, was the
tenant ("Tenant") of a commercial building
located in Salt Lake City. The lease was for a
term of five years, but provided that Tenant
could terminate the lease in advance of the
expiration date by giving six months' notice to
Landlord. Tenant agreed to pay a portion of
the costs of remodeling the space, not exceeding $40,000, if it exercised the option to terminate before the expiration of the lease. On
October 31, 1989, Tenant notified Landlord
that it would vacate the premises on January
1, 1990, and terminate the lease. Because its
new facility was not ready in January, Tenant
actually stayed until February 1,1990.
Landlord brought this action alleging breach
of the lease and demanding as damages all of
the monthly rentals for the three years remaining in the lease. Tenant counterclaimed,
alleging that it was constructively evicted
because of Landlord's failure to make repairs
and perform maintenance work as agreed
under the lease. The trial court granted
summary judgment to Landlord, ruling that

IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Robyn Lynn SNEDDON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Robert GRAHAM and John Wenkel,
Defendants and Appellee.
No. 910418-CA
FILED: November 25, 1991
Second District, Weber County
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor
ATTORNEYS:
Erik M. Ward and Robert K. Hunt, Ogden,
for Appellant
Paul M. Belnap and Lynn S. Davies, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme.
OPINION
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
JACKSON, Judge:
Appellant Robyn Lynn Sneddon appeals
from the trial court's grant of appellee Robert
Graham's motion for summary judgment, and

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

v. Graham
Adv. Rep. 13

the trial court's denial of her motion to
amend her complaint. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
This case arose out of an automobile accident which occurred on April 25, 1986, where
Sneddon was injured when the automobile
operated by John Wenkei collided with
Sneddon's vehicle. Graham and Wenkei had
each purchased approximately a six-pack of
beer on their way home from work on April
24, the night before the accident. At
Graham's home, Graham and Wenkei consumed the beer that had been purchased. Although the facts are in dispute as to who drank
which beer, for purposes of this appeal, the
parties agree that Wenkei consumed the six
cans of beer he had purchased, and consumed
two of the beers that Graham had purchased.
The following morning Wenkei left Graham's
home and collided with Sneddon's vehicle,
which was parked in her driveway.
Sneddon filed her original complaint naming
only Wenkei as defendant in June of 1987. In
March of 1988, Sneddon added Graham as a
codefendant, claiming that under Utah's
Dramshop law, he knew or should have
known that Wenkei was under the influence of
alcohol and was negligent in letting him drive
in that condition. Graham filed a motion for
summary judgment which the trial court
granted on November 3, 1989. The order dismissed all claims against Graham, with prejudice. In late November, Sneddon filed a
motion to amend her complaint to add a
common law negligence claim against Graham,
and also filed a notice of appeal of the
summary judgment in favor of Graham.
Graham moved the supreme court to dismiss
Sneddon's appeal because there were still
claims pending against Wenkei, and therefore,
there was no final order from which Sneddon
could appeal. In December, the parties stipulated to a remand of the appeal to the trial
court to obtain a final order, and the supreme
court granted the motion to dismiss the premature appeal in January 1990.
The trial court denied Sneddon's motion to
amend her complaint, stating that it lacked
jurisdiction. No final order denying this
motion was signed. In January of 1990,
Sneddon again moved the trial court to allow
her to amend her complaint to add a common
law negligence action against Graham. Prior
to the court ruling on this motion, Sneddon
and Wenkei reached a settlement agreement
and all claims against Wenkei were dismissed
on February 14, 1990. The trial court then
denied Sneddon's second motion to amend
her complaint and a final order denying the
motion was entered in April 1990.
Sneddon appeals the trial court's summary
judgment against her, claiming that, contrary
to the trial court's legal conclusion, Utah's
Dramshop law, Utah Code Ann. §32A-14UTAH ADVAi
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1 (1986), applies in a social setting. Sneddon
also appeals the trial court's denial of her
motion to amend her complaint, claiming that
such an amendment would not have prejudiced Graham, and that a common law action
of negligence under these circumstances should
be recognized in this state.
DRAMSHOP LIABILITY
In reviewing the trial court's grant of
summary judgment, we must construe facts in
a light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion. Sikox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc.,
814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah App. 1991).
"Summary judgment can [only] be granted
when no genuine issue of material fact exists,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." Id. at 623 (citations
omitted). "Because the trial court's ruling on
the meaning of a statute presents a question of
law, we review it for correctness, giving no
deference to the trial court's conclusion." Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 233
(Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted).
In the present case, the trial court granted
Graham's motion for summary judgment,
stating that Utah Code Ann. §32A-14-1
(1986) was not intended to apply in a social,
as opposed to commercial, setting. Chapter 14
of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act
(hereinafter the Dramshop Act) establishes
liability for injuries resulting from the intoxication of an individual. It states in pertinent
part:
(1) Any person who directly
gives, sells, or otherwise provides
liquor, or at- a location allowing
consumption on the premises, any
alcoholic beverage, to a person:
(a) who is under the age of 21
years or
(b) who is apparently under the
influence of intoxicating alcoholic
beverages or products or drugs or
(c) whom the person furnishing
the alcoholic beverage knew or
should have known from the circumstances was under the influence
of intoxicating alcoholic beverages
or products or drugs or
(d) who is a known interdicted
person,...
is liable for injuries in person,
property, or means of support to
any third person, or to the spouse,
child, or parent of that third
person, resulting from the intoxication.
U t a h C o d e A n n . §32A-14-1 (1986).
Sneddon claims that the broad language of the
Dramshop Act, as well as public policy, supports extending liability to social hosts.
Graham argues that the language of the
statute and its legislative history indicate an
REPORTS
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intent to extend liability only to the commercial setting.
"Where statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond
to divine legislative intent." Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809
(Utah 1988). However, when the language is
ambiguous, we may attempt to discern the
intention of the legislature. P.I.E. Employees
Fed. Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144,
1151 (Utah 1988). "A statute is ambiguous if it
can be understood by reasonably wellinformed persons to have different meanings."
Tanner, 799 P.2d at 233. While Sneddon urges
us to find to the contrary, because several of
the terms utilized in the Dramshop Act are
defined elsewhere in the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-1 to17 (1986), we hold that section 32A-14-1(1)
is not ambiguous.
For example, "person" is defined as "any
individual, partnership, firm, corporation,
association, business trust, or other form of
business enterprise, including a receiver or
trustee, and the plural as well as the singular
number, unless the intent to give a more
limited meaning is disclosed by the context."
Section 32A-l-5(27). "Liquor" is defined to
specifically exclude any beverage defined as a
beer "that has an alcohol content of less than
4% alcohol by volume," section 32A-15(17), while "alcoholic beverages" "means
'beer' and 'liquor* as the terms are defined
in this s e c t i o n . " Section 32A-1-5(1).
"Premises" is defined as "any building, enclosure, room, or equipment used in connection
with the sale, storage, service, manufacture,
distribution, or consumption of alcoholic
products, unless otherwise defined in this title
or in the rules adopted by the commission."
Section 32A-1-5(29).
When the principal provisions of the Dramshop Act are read in context with the definitions provided by that Act, it is not ambiguous. The statutes plain language explicitly
limits liability to persons who provide alcoholic beverages "at a location allowing consumption on the premises!.]" Conspicuously
absent from the definition of "premises" is the
word "house" or "private residence." See
section 32A-l-5(29).i
We decline to accept Sneddon's arguments,
and affirm the trial court's legal conclusion
that the Dramshop Act does not apply to
individuals in a noncommercial social setting.
AMENDING THE COMPLAINT
We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on
a motion to amend a complaint absent a clear
abuse of discretion. Girard v. Appleby, 660
P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983); Kelly v. Utah
Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Utah
App. 1987).
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for amendment of a complaint
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once as a matter of course at any
time before a responsive pleading is
served or, if the pleading is one to
which no responsive pleading is
permitted and the action has not
been placed upon the trial calendar,
he may so amend it at any time
within 20 days after it is served.
Otherwise a party may amend his
pleading only by leave of court or
by written consent of the adverse
party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires.
In denying Sneddon's motion to amend, the
trial court stated:
The court having previously granted
Defendant's motion for summary
j u d g m e n t and having entered
summary judgment dated November
3, 1989, dismissing the complaint of
the plaintiff with prejudice, the
plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend
Complaint to "add a cause of
action against the d e f e n d a n t ,
Robert Graham, based upon a
theory of common law negligence in
supplying intoxicating liquor to the
codefendant, John Wenlcel."
Having reviewed the motion, and
the memorandum in opposition to
the same, and having heard the
argument of counsel together with
the procedural posture of the case,
with the court having previously
dismissed the plaintiffs complaint,
and the court having indicated at
the time of hearing that if it is
deemed appropriate at the procedural juncture of this case to move
to amend the complaint, the court
is of the opinion that there is not a
common law cause of action
running in favor of a person injured
against a person who supplied
alcohol, nor does the court believe
that the provisions of Utah's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act affords
a plaintiff a cause of action under
the facts and circumstances of this
case
It is unclear whether the trial court denied
Sneddon's motion because it felt it was inappropriate given the procedural posture of the
case, because it had no jurisdiction to amend a
complaint that had been dismissed by
summary judgment, or, as Sneddon contends,
because the court was of the opinion that a
common iaw negligence cause of action could
not be raised given the facts of the case.
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not dispose of all claims of all parties, and
A. Timeliness of Sneddon's Motion to Amend
which has not been certified as a final judgGraham argues that the trial court properly ment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules
denied Sneddon's motion to amend her com- of Civil Procedure, is not a final judgment for
plaint because of the age of the initial comp- purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Steck v.
laint, the development of discovery, the dis- Aagaire, 789 P.2d 708 (Utah 1990) (per
missal of Sneddon's claim against Graham, curiam). Rule 54(b) states:
and the potential prejudice to Graham.
When more than one claim for
"In considering a motion to amend, the trial
relief is presented in an action,
judge must decide 'whether the opposing side
whether as a claim, counterclaim,
would be put to unfavorable prejudice by
cross-claim, or third-party claim,
having an issue adjudicated for which he had
and/or when multiple parties are
not time to prepare."' Kelly, 746 P.2d at 1190
involved, the court may direct the
(quoting Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664
entry of a final judgment as to one
P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983)). In Kelly, the
or more but fewer than all of the
plaintiff sought to add two defendants more
claims or parties only upon an
than three years after the case was initiated.
express determination by the court
This court concluded the trial court acted
that there is no just reason for
within its discretion in denying the plaintiffs
delay and upon an express direction
motion to amend her complaint, reasoning
for the entry of judgment. In the
that it was unfair to expect the defendants to
absence of such determination and
be prepared to defend an additional action at
direction, any order or other form
such a late date. See also Westley v. Farmer's
of decision, however designated,
Ins. Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983) (per
which adjudicates fewer than all the
curiam) (since amendment to complaint would
claims or the rights and liabilities of
have delayed trial and substance of new allefewer than all the parties shall not
gation was known to plaintiff a full year
terminate
the action as to any of
earlier, no abuse in denying motion).
the claims or parties, and the order
In the present case, Sneddon sought to
or other form of decision is subject
amend her complaint more than two years
to revision at any time before the
after the filing of her original complaint. The
entry of judgment adjudicating all
trial court had already granted her leave to
the claims and the rights and liabiadd Graham as a party after the action was
lities of all the parties.
filed. When Sneddon again moved the court
As Sneddon asserts, the dismissal of her
for permission to amend, the case was set for
trial later that month. We believe that it would claim as to Graham did not wholly dispose of
almost certainly be prejudicial to Graham to her case. There were still claims pending
allow Sneddon to amend her complaint to add against Wenkel. Therefore, while the supreme
an entirely new cause of action at such a late court may not have had jurisdiction to enterdate, in the course of the proceedings. Acco- tain an appeal where the trial court had not
rdingly, we cannot say that the trial court entered a final judgment as to both Graham
abused its discretion in denying Sneddon's and Wenkel, see, e.g., A.J. Mackay Co. v.
Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah
motion.
1991); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax
Comm% 814 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1991),
B. The Order of Dismissal as to Graham as a
the trial court continued to have jurisdiction
Final Adjudication
As to whether the trial court had jurisdic- until all claims had been settled. The trial
tion to entertain Sneddon's motion to amend, court had jurisdiction to rule on Sneddon's
Sneddon argues that the summary judgment in motion to amend her complaint, and it exerfavor of Graham did not become a final jud- cised that jurisdiction in denying the motion.
gment until the court entered its order denying
CONCLUSION
Sneddon's motion to amend her complaint,
For the foregoing reasons, both the trial
on April 16, 1990. Sneddon incorrectly argues
that if the dismissal of her claims against court's grant of Graham's motion for
Graham was not a final order so as to permit summary judgment, and the denial of
appeal, then it was not a final order so as to Sneddon's motion to amend her complaint,
2
prevent the trial court from granting leave to are affirmed.
amend her complaint.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
An order that does not wholly dispose of a
WE CONCUR:
claim or a party is not final, and therefore not
Judith M. Billings, Judge
appealable. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1984); Backstrom Family
Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, 1159
1. Sneddon urges us to overlook this omission,
(Utah App. 1988). A trial court's granting of
a motion for summary judgment which does arguing that the legislative history of the Dramshop
Act indicates it was intended possession and use of
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alcohol in a social setting as well. We disagree.
The legislative history of the Dramshop Act
underscores this interpretation. The original Dramshop Act statute, added to the Intoxicating Liquor
Code in 1981, imposed liability upon any person
who "gives, sells, or otherwise provides intoxicating
liquor to another, contrary to subsection 16-613.1(8)(d), subsection 32-l-36.5(l)(l), section 327-14 or subsection 32-7-24(b) or (c) ...." Utah
Code Ann. §32-11-1 (Supp. 1981) (repealed
1985). The sections referred to in the statute provided for the imposition of liability upon persons
supplying alcohol to "any person under or apparently under the influence of liquor,* Utah Code Ann.
§32-7-14 (1966) (repealed 1985), or upon persons
who "permit drunkenness to take place in any house
or on any premises of which he is the owner, tenant
or occupant; or (b) permit or suffer any person
apparently under the influence of liquor to consume
any liquor in any house or on any premises^) ...."
Utah Code Ann. §32-7-24(a)-(b) (1966)
(emphasis added) (repealed 1985).
In 1985, Title 32, Intoxicating Liquors, was repealed and replaced by Title 32A, the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act. An amended version of the
Dramshop Act was enacted and codified as §32A14-1 (1986), and amended versions of §§32-714 and 32-7-24 were enacted and codified as
§§32A-12-9 and 32A-12-21 (1986). The
amended Dramshop Act makes no reference to
other sections of the Alcoholic Beverage Code.
Instead, the prohibited acts are included in the
Dramshop Act statute itself. The words "house, * or
"private residence" do not appear in any of the
amended statutes. Only the word "premises* appears
in §§32A-12-21 and 32A-14-1.
2. Sneddon also urges us to recognize a common
law action of negligence in the context of a social
host, an issue which had not been addressed in the
courts of this state to date. However, we note the
Utah Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement
(Second) of Torts §315, which states that no duty
can be found to protect another from harm unless
and until a special relationship exists between the
parties. See Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d
413 (Utah 1986) (supreme court affirmed summary
judgment in favor of defendant where plaintiff
failed to show affirmative duty existed on part of
defendant to protect plaintiff from harm). No such
relationship has been established between Sneddon
and Graham.
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OPINION
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
This is a consolidated appeal by defendants
Douglas R. Morck and Arthur J. Hobbs of
their convictions of taking or possessing protected wildlife without a proper permit, a class
A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §23-20-3 (1984). They argue that the
trial court erred in denying their motion to
suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless
search of their truck. They contend that the
search violated their rights under Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
On May 23, 1990, the Division of Wildlife
Services (DWS) received a phone call from a
confidential informant alleging that defendants
were going to the Book Cliffs area, near the
Ute Indian reservation in Southern Utah, to
hunt bear without a valid permit for that area.
The informant stated that defendants planned
to gain access to the Ute Indian reservation
posing as fishermen. The informant also stated
that defendants would be camped on the rim
between Flatnose, George Canyon and Weaver
Reservoir. One of the DWS officers knew
from personal experience that both defendants
had hunted bear in the Book Cliffs in the
past. He also confirmed that defendants did
not have valid hunting permits for that area,
but did have bear hunting permits for other
undersubscribed areas of the state.
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